Unlike the federal constitution, many states make use of direct democracy mechanisms to allow for voter involvement in amending state constitutions. In so doing, state supreme courts are far more vulnerable than federal courts to having "the people" repudiate their constitutional interpretations. What does this mean in terms of the ways state courts--when interpreting state constitutions-- should interface with voters and elected officials? Should state courts be especially cautious when exercising judicial review? Should states with hard-to-amend constitutions make different calculations than states with easy-to-amend constitutions? What then of the role of state lawmakers; is the constitutional dialogue between state courts and state officials fundamentally different in states with easy-to-amend constitutions? And what about the sensibility of a system in which state voters can amend state constitutions through citizen initiatives? This panel will explore these and other questions. The focus will be on the practical implications for state courts, state lawmakers, and interest groups (social movements). Some attention will also be paid to the broader implications of all this--both theoretical questions about the nature of constitutional dialogues and practical questions about institutional design.
Business Meeting at Program Conclusion.