This program will consider how settled constitutional arrangements have contributed to recent transformations in financial markets and institutions; and how law may be reformed through constitutional interpretation and legislative action to transform financial markets and institutions in the future. The panel will address issues of accountability, autonomy, and delegation of authority to administrative agencies. Professor Nagy will discuss the pending constitutional challenge to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the wake of the Enron and related corporate governance and accounting scandals. Professor Epstein will critique the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the $700 billion program administered by the Treasury Department to prop up the nation’s commercial banks, as well as other financial institutions and industrial corporations. Dean Canova will critique the Federal Reserve’s unique institutional structure which provides the central bank with broad powers, significant autonomy, and limited accountability. Professor Tushnet will offer an historical analysis of the development of the modern administrative state, and a defense of the PCAOB and other appointments processes and delegations as consistent with constitutional principles. Panelists will consider the salience of these constitutional and rule of law issues in a transformative environment for our politics and the global economy.