Protecting Military
Association at Work
Marcy Karin, University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law
The military has exponentially increased its use of part-time civilian members of the Reserve Components since 9/11. This war cohort also has produced the largest number of returning servicemembers with disabilities in history. Unfortunately, existing civilian workplace protections fail to offer holistic protection to cover the needs of these servicemembers and their caregivers. Further, these laws fail to protect the non-familial relationships that have become standard to the recovery, care, and reintegration of returning cohort members. The article begins by surfacing these needs and experiences, including the shortcomings of the existing patchwork of employment law. Next, it proposes a new protection in response to this reality: antidiscrimination coverage on the basis of military association. In so doing, it explores failed Congressional promises, as well as policy and practical arguments for the
proposal. It also counters anticipated critiques of the proposal and analyzes the potential impact on the normative response to the effect of war at civilian workplaces specifically and the ability of employment law to address caregiving needs more generally. Finally, I hope it sparks additional discourse on these mostly ignored—yet increasingly important—laws and worker needs, especially as applied to this “most favored” worker population.
Enforceability of ALJ Decisions
Against Noncompliant Executive Agencies
Samir Hanna, The University of Michigan Law School
Generally, it
is assumed that when a plaintiff wins a lawsuit, the defendant will pay in
accordance with the judge’s order. Experience, however, tells a different
story. Compliance is not always the case, particularly when the government is
the defendant. As a result, the prevailing plaintiff is forced to appeal to
enforce the lower judgment. While this is likely a feasible method for
represented parties, the problem is exacerbated when the plaintiff is
unrepresented.
Specifically,
in state administrative hearings, this problem is at its worst. There is the
greatest disparity between the parties – the state government on one end and an
often unrepresented claimant on the other. As a result, the government can
choose not to comply with little to no repercussions.1 The primary question
then is: how can under-resourced and unrepresented parties enforce favorable ALJ
decisions against noncompliant executive agencies?