Jewish law has various rules that seem very difficult to fathom from a comparative perspective, and sometimes are challenging to understand from its own internal discourse. To give a couple of examples: the evidentiary rule that bans guilty confessions in rabbinic court; and the rule that if the entire court votes to convict in a capital case, the defendant goes free. How can a legal system operate with such rules, and why would they be adopted? These rules seem especially anomalous relative to other legal systems where confession and unanimity are seen as optimal modes of evidence and judicial administration.
A parallel question can also be raised for all legal traditions, including American law. For example, scholars have written much about anomalies found in the rule against perpetuities, the rules and exceptions of hearsay, and a number of anomalies in the US Constitution. These writings usually seek to expose these anomalies in order to propose reform, which is frequently the best plan of action. But this same phenomenon can be examined more analytically as a wider feature of legal traditions. All legal systems have various rules that are anomalous, and yet sometimes they are firmly entrenched. Why is this? Are these rules ways of putting a distinct signature on a legal tradition? Do they start to ironically become emblematic of a given legal tradition? Are they so familiar that people become blind to their anomalous nature? Does this reflect an inherently conservative disposition of legal traditions? Does this tell us something about the culture of law?
This panel will explore the larger phenomenon or specific examples of anomalies or paradoxes in Jewish law, and try to understand their etiology, impact or even justification. It will also reflect on the parallel phenomenon in general jurisprudence.
Business Meeting at Program Conclusion.