In the heated 2012 presidential election cycle, most Americans will cast primary and general election ballots on aging computer-based voting systems built to standards that date at best from the early 2000s. At least 33 States now permit email, e-fax, or other internet transmission of voted ballots for military and civilian overseas absentee voters.
This cross-cutting program will make high-tech election issues accessible for law professors (no previous technical expertise required!) through presentations from experts in computer science, statistics/political science, and government as well as legal scholars. The program will identify issues in urgent need of attention from scholars in administrative law, computer and internet law, election law, legislation and the political process, and other areas.
Premier computer scientists have evaluated currently-deployed electronic systems, finding flawed software and an ease of tampering even by hackers with little expertise. Yet those repeatedly confirmed scientific findings have had surprisingly little effect on law, regulation and the implementation of voting technology. In 2008, this flawed equipment was used in states that produced 160 electoral votes and elected substantial portions of the Senate and House, and most states have not made improvements for 2012. This program will provide background and explore legal approaches and next steps.
Panel I (9:00 – 9:50): Understanding Computer Vulnerabilities.
Professors Andrew Appel of Princeton and David Wagner of Berkeley (both experienced in translating computer science into comprehensible insights for policymakers) will provide an overview of the ways in which computers have been integrated into the election process, explain the design flaws that can cause serious undetectable problems in election results, and identify safeguards that are essential – though largely unused --