Sessions Information

  • January 6, 2021
    11:00 am - 12:15 pm
    Session Type: Section Programs
    Session Capacity: N/A
    Hotel: N/A
    Room: N/A
    Floor: N/A

    Best effort clauses in contracts are prevalent and in some sense paradoxical. For instance, in the extensive literature on the economics of contracts, it is almost universally accepted that “effort” is non-contractable because it is unobservable and unverifiable by courts or other arbitral bodies, yet everyday lawyers are busy drafting hundreds or thousands of best effort clauses. What exactly accounts for this apparent disconnect between economic theory and legal practice? We will to explore this question among others by examining scholarship and practice on topic of best effort clauses.

Session Speakers
Organization: ETH Zurich Center for Law & Economics

Organization: Columbia Law School

Organization: New York University School of Law

Organization: Stanford Law School

Organization: Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

Organization: University of California, Los Angeles School of Law

Session Fees
  • [3030] Contracts - Contracting for Effort: The Law and Economics of Best and Reasonable Effort Clauses: $0.00