Sessions Information

  • January 6, 2021
    11:00 am - 12:15 pm
    Session Type: Section Programs
    Session Capacity: N/A
    Hotel: N/A
    Room: N/A
    Floor: N/A
    Best effort clauses in contracts are prevalent and in some sense paradoxical. For instance, in the extensive literature on the economics of contracts, it is almost universally accepted that “effort” is non-contractable because it is unobservable and unverifiable by courts or other arbitral bodies, yet everyday lawyers are busy drafting hundreds or thousands of best effort clauses. What exactly accounts for this apparent disconnect between economic theory and legal practice? We will to explore this question among others by examining scholarship and practice on topic of best effort clauses.
Session Speakers
ETH Zurich Center for Law & Economics

Columbia Law School

New York University School of Law

Stanford Law School

Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

University of California, Los Angeles School of Law

Session Fees
  • [3030] Contracts - Contracting for Effort: The Law and Economics of Best and Reasonable Effort Clauses: $0.00